The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of functional ascriptions used to explain cancer. I do that in two steps. In the first part of the paper I briefly analyse different functional accounts in the philosophical literature and I explore the extent to which cellular models of cancer meet traditional accounts. I argue that these models require an integration of functional explanations that is not, however, fulfilled due to some reductionist assumptions of these models. I thus show that non-reductionist accounts of cancer give us a relevant contribution in understanding this disease, which is nevertheless better captured by an organizational account of functions. Some final conclusions are presented regarding the explanatory relevance of the biological context and its relationship to the normative dimension of biological functions.
On the Structure of Biological Explanations: Beyond Functional Ascriptions in Cancer Research
Bertolaso M
2013-01-01
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of functional ascriptions used to explain cancer. I do that in two steps. In the first part of the paper I briefly analyse different functional accounts in the philosophical literature and I explore the extent to which cellular models of cancer meet traditional accounts. I argue that these models require an integration of functional explanations that is not, however, fulfilled due to some reductionist assumptions of these models. I thus show that non-reductionist accounts of cancer give us a relevant contribution in understanding this disease, which is nevertheless better captured by an organizational account of functions. Some final conclusions are presented regarding the explanatory relevance of the biological context and its relationship to the normative dimension of biological functions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
